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1
The budget has been to our era what civil rights, communism, the
depression, industrialization, and slavery were at other times.1
Budget deficits are bad, very bad indeed. Creating them was indulgent. Tolerating
their continued existence, insufferable. Or, so we are led to believe. The 1990s has
so far been a decade of budget-cutting austerity and restructuring in most
advanced industrialized countries. Great attention is directed to competitiveness
as the liberalization of trade rules is extended further, and as governments seek
to attract scarce financial capital (Sinclair, 1992; Krugman, 1994; Gill and Law,
1989; Cerny, 1993). In many countries, government budget deficits have been
identified by neoliberal policy intellectuals as one of the leading causes of
relatively lower growth rates and persistent unemployment (Williamson, 1994:
26). Deficit reduction has become a major priority for governments, and
strategically important elements within many civil societies seem to support this
objective.
As this paper demonstrates, however, the social and financial impacts of budget
deficits are debateable, and the costs and benefits they generate vary for different
social interests. The 'common sense' of deficit discourse actually tells us little
about what is really at stake in public finance. The more compelling observation
about this deficit discourse of the 1990s is the degree to which its real significance
lies in areas beyond the strictly fiscal. The deficit discourse is therefore properly
understood with a "lens that is wider" than that usually deployed (Murphy, 1994:
10), as a mechanism of social and political hegemony construction and
maintenance, rather than as an exogenous set of policy ideas, as it is in the
orthodox liberal account. In structural terms, the deficit discourse must be
considered in terms of broad processes of making sense of the world we live in
under conditions of increasing uncertainty (Beck, 1992; Beck, Giddens and Lash,
1994; Bernstein, 1996). Within this context, deficit discourse can be linked to the
particular interests of globalizing elites, which seek to shape it to their purpose of
developing strategies of wealth-creation and political control.2 The deficit
discourse, therefore, can be thought of as an important element of what Gramsci
saw as the intellectual and political leadership necessary to the maintenance and
reconstruction of world order (Murphy,1994: 11). 
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3. See Gill, 1992: 159 and Sinclair, 1995: 5-8.
The argument to be made here is that the deficit discourse is best understood as
a product of a set of conditions which bring into question many of the core ideas,
institutions and material capacities that have been at the center of the dominant
system of wealth-creation and social control since World War II. These
conditions include low growth, a perceived failure of state activism to solve
poverty and crime, hypercompetitiveness, and a disenchantment with elite
political administration. An important strategic initiative in response to this set of
conditions (or threats) on the part of globalizing elites, has been to generate what
Gill has identified as "new constitutional" governance devices. This new
constitutionalism can be understood as "the political project of attempting to
make liberal democratic capitalism the sole model for future development,"
through the creation of a defensive system for the new spatially-extended
relationships that comprise an increasingly global economic system.3 I argue that
the deficit discourse is closely related to this development, and operates as a way,
mentally and in practice, of closing sets of practices off from contestation, or at
least of greatly narrowing the parameters of the public debate in ways that sustain
a globalizing hegemony. An important feature of the discourse has been the
propagation of a framework of thought centring around what are called
synchronic assumptions, in which policy issues are increasingly interpreted in elite
circles (Cox with Sinclair,1996: 179-183; Sinclair, 1997). Synchronic assumptions,
which dominate financial markets, are short-term in nature, and are at odds with
the planning, research and development logic required of diachronic or
productive processes that underpin the maintenance of social cohesion and
growth (Cox with Sinclair, 1996: 181). The propagation of this infrastructure of
thought and practice by means of the deficit discourse may be the discourse's
most important impact in the long run.
This argument is developed in three sections. In the first, the broader context or
set of conditions which makes the deficit discourse possible is considered. This
includes both the material and discursive conditions of possibility. The second
element of the paper looks at the social construction of the discourse itself. Here
attention is given to examining the literature on budget deficits. The purpose of
this discussion is to undermine the idea that there is actually unanimity on deficit
matters, despite appearances that suggest there is, by providing a sense of the
main lines of contestation. This is followed by a brief discussion of the
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production of the discourse itself, the processes which are central here, and an
outline of the way power is exercised in this production. The last part of the
paper considers a series of implications that follow from the emergence of deficit
discourse. Some arguments related to investment, knowledge and governance
issues are made here. 
CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY
Five conditions of possibility have allowed for the development of what I term
deficit discourse. They each in their own way relate to the transactional volatility,
authority re-allocation and transformations of work which seem to lie at the heart
of the phenomenon called globalization (Sassen, 1996; Mittelman, 1996). These
conditions have enabled the creation of the deficit discourse, although none of
them has made it inevitable. How the discourse seems to have been socially
constructed is considered in the subsequent section. The five conditions of
possibility comprise an absence of prosperity, the perceived failure of state
activism, hypercompetitiveness and its effects on individual consciousness, intra-
elite conflict and disciplinary social regulation, and the much more entrenched
condition of patriarchy.
The absence of prosperity condition has undermined the basis of the established
ensemble of hegemonic relationships which underpinned the post-war world
order. This order was premised on critical side-payments between hegemonic
social forces (the antecedents of the contemporary globalizing elites), and
subordinate social forces which had been brought into alliance with them, such
as privileged or semi-skilled industrial workers. These side payments were
premised on growth and constant productivity improvement. Mass production
(and thus mass consumption) systems grew out of this set of social arrangements,
organized around highly rationalized work processes (Amin, 1994). However,
with the onset of inflation in the late 1960s, this system became less able to
deliver the sort of growth that was necessary for its own maintenance. Rising
unemployment challenged the welfarist norms that had been enshrined in this set
of social alliances, by raising the costs of the system, just as the capacity to
support the existing level of transfers fell (Pierson, 1994). The effect of these
circumstances was the gradual development of a sense of crisis and a demand for
new solutions. However, because of the wide popularity of many of the tax
transfers created in the post-war prosperity amongst OECD nations, this search
was more problematic than it had been previously. There was great reluctance
amongst subordinate social forces to go along with policy change of this sort. The
crisis would require more infrastructural strategies to develop lasting solutions in
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most countries, although anti-labor campaigns were effectively deployed in some
places, such as Britain.
If the first condition created a sense of ongoing crisis that would, on the whole,
not find any ready solution in the strategies of the past, the second condition
destroyed the idea that solutions were actually possible or desirable. A crisis of
confidence developed in the perceived effectiveness of state intervention in the
western economies. Possible causes for this scepticism about the social utility of
the state lie in the stubbornness of low growth, despite repeated efforts to refire
the post-war growth dynamic through corporatist wage arrangements, large
infrastructure and energy projects, and the nationalization of 'strategic' industrial
assets. The reversal of many of these initiatives in the second half of the 1980s
only reinforced the sense that states were impotent. More recently, the re-
emergence of international capital mobility has made states behave in ways which
demonstrate to hegemonic and subordinate social forces alike, that states no
longer preside as supreme sources of effective authority (Ferguson and
Mansbach, 1991; Cohen, 1996). Although states retain legitimate legal power, the
substance of their actions demonstrates a diminution of their capacity to act in
ways which can effectively refocus social organization toward collective goals.
The reassertion of economics in a non-Keynesian, marketized form, which has
characterised the period since the mid-1980s, has further strengthened this
diminution process by arguing that states do not possess the capacity to make
effective choices in markets, because they lack full information and are driven by
political imperatives which are not conducive to sound business decisions
(Rhoads, 1985). This has now become the point of departure for policy initiatives
in the central bureaucratic institutions of western societies, although this norm
varies in intensity, and is at times challenged in the less salient departments which
are responsible for maintaining the social safety net. On the whole, however, we
can say that it is no longer possible to make convincing arguments about state
action in ways that were commonplace in the post-war era. 
The third condition which supports the deficit discourse relates directly to the
individual's sense of personal survival. Hypercompetitivesss has become a central
feature of everyday life in the West, and increasingly in what was the communist
bloc too. This perception relates to what we might typically think of as
globalization: plant closures and relocation to low-wage countries, increased trade
flows, investment mobility, quickened turnover times, and so forth. But these
material developments are matched by a new intersubjective understanding that
the old regime of expectations is no longer operative. The forty hour weeks, work
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rules, demarcation lines, mass production and large numbers of cheap, standard
goods for consumption, had a core logic which to a degree valued the individual's
reproduction, at least as an economic agent. But this set of expectations, broadly
protective of the individual's well-being, has now been replaced by fierce
competition of a zero-sum kind, often between workers (Gill, 1995). At the level
of consciousness, this means the individual in the West increasingly views his or
her workplace as a danger zone, in which the career failure of fellow employees
is considered necessary to maintaining a semblance of one's personal security.
Features of hypercompetitiveness include this collective moral instrumentalism
about work relationships (intensive hypercompetitiveness), and the extensive
hypercompetitiveness of the longer working day. Importantly,
hypercompetitiveness reduces the propensity of the individual to mentally place
themselves in the situation of others, thus reducing their tolerance for taxation
and for others acting as their representatives. Individualization is greatly
enhanced, and forms of collectivization are increasingly less possible.
Intra-hegemonic conflict is also an important condition of possibility for the
deficit discourse. This condition speaks to the issue of leadership, and its necessity
in a well-functioning system of social trade-offs between diverging and
converging interests, and at the world order level, amongst states. Although
certain policy options seem to have been effectively ruled out in the globalized
conditions, there is an absence of agreement amongst elites on solutions to large-
scale problems of the biosphere, of financial volatility and market panics, and of
development in peripheral parts of the world system such as Africa. Gill has also
identified the simultaneous development of a more narrow, disciplinary mode of
social regulation of non-hegemonic social forces (Gill, 1995). This reflects the
inability on many issues to establish a genuine and lasting set of trade-offs
between interests. Differences over economic policy, say, which have been
generated by business and industrial decline, increasingly come to be 'solved' by
the imposition of new frameworks which have very particular benefits (for
example, for the City of London). This way of solving intra-elite differences of
view has had a chilling effect on the nature of public debate. The range of what
can be contested has significantly diminished. The crucial feature of this
environment is to present a picture of ongoing consensus to subordinate social
forces, and to conceal this absence of lasting agreement at the core of social
coordination.
The last condition of possibility that will be mentioned is patriarchy. This is a
broader and much more pervasive condition than the others we have considered.
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4. Much more could be said about this condition than is possible here.
Workman's writings have made an important contribution by making it
possible to think about fiscal issues in these terms (Workman, 1996: 55-69).
Workman has suggested that ideas about courage and sacrifice, fears of loss of
control, abstract representations of policy choices, and the determination of
authoritative speech, amongst other things, which are at the center of the
construction of maleness, have helped lay the groundwork for the development
of deficit discourse (Workman, 1996: 55-69). For example, he notes that
discussions of public finance are typically shrouded in a scientistic language which
obscures the concrete nature of productive activity. Because our daily lives are
real experiences and not abstract, the representations of these issues in symbolic
form helps to "insulate the discussants from considering the human side effects
of their policy recommendations, and inure them to criticism" (Workman, 1996:
64).4 Discussions of budget deficits, and of budget-cutting, can be undertaken
without any consideration of consequences (and thus of their meaning for most
people), freeing those who engage in these discussions to pursue elite agendas,
because the accepted language employed by participants de-socializes and
technicizes the organization of state funds.
These five conditions have not in themselves brought about the deficit discourse
(nor are they an exclusive list). They are not agents of change. Instead, they
represent transformation in the limits on agents, providing motive and
opportunity for the transformation of previously coherent and seemingly fixed
social relationships (Braudel, 1980: 31).
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEFICIT DISCOURSE
So much for the conditions which have made the deficit discourse possible. Let
us now examine the processes of social creation or construction of the deficit
discourse. A key assumption in this interpretation is that particular accounts of
the world go on to shape lived experience, because our social action reflects the
norms and expectations we share as if these were material or 'real' structures
(Wendt, 1992). Getting control over the process of discourse creation is therefore
a significant question of power. Because "discourses are assets" of power in the
hegemonic struggle, it is important to treat these discourses sceptically rather than
as direct, true accounts of the world (Shapiro, 1996: xviii). This requires the
investigator to adopt a genealogical approach, which seeks to historicize
knowledge as reflective of particular interests, times and places (Devetak, 1996:
185). In the long-run, the goal of our investigation should be to isolate a "core
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logic" - a more fundamental discourse - comprising "describable sets of formally
related assumptions and procedures" which construct social phenomena, and
organize initiatives for change, such as public policy (Patten, 1996: 366-367). This
paper is a preliminary contribution to this objective.
Since the early 1980s, there has been an internal and external attack on the
magnitude and purposes of government financing. Most recently, in a context of
steady or falling tax rates, criticism has focused on budget deficits. Contrary to
seemingly informed understandings, there is a debate of sorts surrounding
government budget deficits (Savage, 1994: 100). However, this is not a mass,
public debate. It is for the most part an internal, closed discussion amongst
experts. The most striking characteristic of this debate is what appears to be an
implicit agreement amongst the professionals involved that the conversation
remain an internal one amongst them. The external face, which is familiar from
television news, lacks qualification about deficits. Equivocation has been strikingly
absent here, where a chorus of commentators from think tanks, corporations and
other representatives of elite opinion have called for a fundamental revision of
governmental utilization of deficit financing across the developed countries
(Republican National Committee, 1994: 23-26). Over time, we might say that the
sheer repetition of this call has become a "dull background noise, a kind of
invisible yet inescapable fact of life... [an alternative view] then comes to sound
like a curious, offkey whine" (McQuaig, 1995: 13). Gradually, a restructuring of
the parameters of acceptable speech surrounding governmental finance and
action has occurred in the OECD. The rhetoric of this campaign has been
remarkable in character, volume, and frequency perhaps in an effort to
communicate clear messages about arcane matters of economic and financial
deliberation through the vehicle of tabloid journalism. This effort to generate
public crises in the developed countries around budget deficits is best understood
as a way of securing mass support for the reconstitution of hegemony. The
immediate consequences of this struggle for influence over mass society are subtle
but important changes in the bundles of mental schemata of perception and
action which prefigure social relations by defining situations and providing
interpretive procedures to us all (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 18). The best
historical parallel to draw is with the campaign waged against inflation in the
1980s. Over time, this very successful effort to influence consciousness cemented
into mass thinking the idea that inflation was universally bad, even when it was
generally more favorable to wage earners and debtors than to ownership interests
and creditors.
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5. Lury defines habitus as a set "of dispositions, a system which organizes the
individual's capacity to act" (Lury, 1996: 83). It can also be thought of as a
framework of taste and preference.
Data on budget deficits do not support the idea of crisis. The federal government
of the United States, for example, has run a deficit more or less continuously
since 1970, and had an accumulated national debt in fiscal 1995 of about $5
trillion, $3.6 trillion of which was held outside government trust funds (Galbraith
and Darity, Jr., 1995: 5-6). This sum, when considered as a proportion of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1995, was about 52 percent. This proportion has in
fact changed very little since 1939, when US Government debt as a percentage
of GDP was around 47 percent (Eisner, 1994: 95). Globally, countries such as
Canada, that have demonstrated high growth in the post-recession years of the
1990s, supported what were perceived to be high deficits and accumulated debt.
Other very rich countries like Belgium top the league tables in accumulated debt,
at around 130 percent of GDP in fiscal 1995 (The Economist, February 3, 1996: 105).
This data suggests there is no obvious or automatic link between fiscal rectitude
in budgeting terms and economic success. Looking at the analytical supports it
starts to become clear why this link is not found. Oddly perhaps, given the
absolutist nature of the deficit discourse, there is, in fact, no numerical criteria of
what is a good deficit and what a bad one (other than the assumption that larger
deficits are worse than smaller ones). Inconveniently, public finance and
economics do not provide criteria of rectitude. Any figures, therefore, have to be
interpreted, and the macroeconomic circumstances surrounding them must be
considered, to arrive at a reasonable view of the current state of affairs.
Precisely this point about the qualification required in the interpretation of
numbers is lacking in the deficit discourse. The reason for this, in the first
instance, is that anti-deficit thinking has its origins in historical experience,
political theory and the adjustment of what Bourdieu calls habitus, by globalizing
elites, and not in the supposedly technical output of economic or financial
analysis.5 As Savage has noted, in the US, the issue of balanced budgets ultimately
refers to the debate about the appropriate role of the federal government in
American society. The balanced budget "serves as an organizing principle that
guides public policy and public discourse and acts as a symbol for competing
visions" (Savage, 1988: 1). This context for US fiscal policy developed as a
response to the aversion to European "corruption" that was important in the
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6. Savage notes that post-colonial Americans thought "Corruption was most
easily achieved when unscrupulous ministers took advantage of speculative
opportunities offered by a large public debt and the government's need for
revenues. The presence of a substantial public debt, or an abundance of excess
revenues, justified a minister's claim that his agency required additional
employees to administer the government's finances, thus enlarging his ability
to offer graft and patronage" (Savage, 1988: 94).
7. On Keynesian hegemony in the US, see Stern, 1964 and Chamberlain,
1966.
founding of the American republic.6 A balanced budget symbolized restraint of
federal government authority. This represents, argues Savage, the triumph of
Jeffersonian ideas about government, which emphasized decentralization,
restrictions on federal power and states' rights, over the (more European)
Hamiltonian model, which valued enhanced federal authority, reduced state
competence and federal promotion of the economy as primary positions. Van der
Pijl's work allows us to connect Lockeian premises to the Jeffersonian ideas, and
Hobbesian ones to those of Hamilton, and thus to recast the US debate globally
(van der Pijl, 1995: 100).
The strong linkage of deficit politics to thinking about contemporary morality is
evident in much of the anti-deficit writing. The most eloquent articulator of the
relationship of moral constraints and deficits is Buchanan (Buchanan, 1995: 347-
355). Others have noted a "norm" of budgetary balance, and how this suffered
erosion under Keynesian influence in most parts of the world between 1933 and
1979 (Kettl, 1992: 17 and 21). Buchanan argues that the moral discipline (at least
in public) that characterized the British Treasury and parliamentary elites in
Keynes' era, and allowed for a regime of implicit norms to govern public finance
there, could not be successfully translated to the American (or other) contexts, as
Keynes' ideas about fiscal policy grew in popularity around the world. The greater
number of self-seeking actors, and the decentralized nature of constitutional
arrangements, meant that once Keynesian ideas had given the US Government
the new role of economic manager, moral constraints were removed from deficit
spending, and public expenditure could grow without moral hinderance
(Buchanan, 1985: 1-6). The problem with Buchanan's argument, however, is that
if it is moral constraints which have been lost, why then have deficits only
consistently characterised the period since 1970? What of the first forty years or
so after World War II, when Keynesian ideas were hegemonic in the US and
elsewhere, and yet deficits were still largely creatures of war?7 The more probable
explanation for recent growth in deficit figures, as Eisner argues, is that the
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relative lack of economic growth in recent times is at fault. He cites, for example,
the Congressional Budget Office estimate that each one percent of additional
unemployment adds around $50 billion to the US federal budget deficit (Eisner,
1994: 94).
What of the other arguments made by the promoters of deficit discourse? The
purpose of this paper is not to defend budget deficits as an optimal policy choice.
Rather, our purpose is to peel back the common sense propagated by deficit
discourse, to relativize it, and to demonstrate that this mechanism of hegemony
actually rests on an unsure footing in the sense that it is, in fact, a mechanism for
the promotion of particular interests, and not just a 'technical' matter. The main
arguments made against deficits are, first, that deficits 'crowd out' efficient private
investment because the government soaks up all available cash. Second, deficits
lower long-term savings rates. Last, that they cause inflation. To the extent that
these issues are discussed outside policy-making circles they are presented in an
unsophisticated way by using analogies to our own private incomes and
expenditures. Just as one must manage one's personal finances with an eye to
income and be aware of the opportunity cost of purchases, so, this view contends,
governments face the same choices. This assumption, of an individual unit in
isolation, upon which much of the deficit discourse is founded, is false.
Governments do not face similar constraints to individuals. There is not, for
example, a finite stock of financial resources awaiting investment in either private
or public forms, as confirmed by evidence of falling interest rates in high deficit
periods (Belton, Jr. and Cebula, 1995; Savage, 1994: 104). Nor can discrete
national quantities of monetary resources be identified. Similarly, with savings
rates, Eisner argues convincingly that they only exist in a circuit - in relation - to
other activities. By reducing governmental outlays, pressures are brought to bear
elsewhere. Mass layoffs of government employees, for example, might impose
costs in terms of increased welfare expenses. The rapid increase in expenditure
on private security in recent years in the United States is one example of flow-on
effects, where private spending now overshadows public by 73 percent, up from
57 percent a decade ago (Blumenthal, 1993). The implication of Eisner's view is
that the orthodox economic arguments about deficits lack consideration of
diachronic factors: the actual conditions of resource use themselves. The primary
issue here, according to Eisner, is whether there are actually slack resources or
not. If there are, then deficits are more likely than not to raise savings rates and
assist output, employment and consumption (Eisner, 1994: 119). It follows that
deficits do not necessarily bring inflation. It all depends on the state of things -
the diachronic conditions - and if deficits generate purchasing power that would
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otherwise be lacking, they can mobilize economic life. Deficits can, on this logic,
be "too small" as well as "too big" (Eisner, 1994: 102).
At core, what jumps out from the economic literature on deficits is the low
valuation placed on governmental activities as a feature of wealth-creation.
Krugman, for instance, distinguishes governmental activity from "real
investment" that could have been used to raise productivity, and this seems to be
a widely held view (Krugman, 1994: 159; Rhoads, 1985). The very center of the
deficit discourse is, therefore, actually about transforming the guiding set of
norms generated by the Keynesian welfare state more than it is concerned with
changing narrow fiscal matters. What is interesting about it politically-speaking
is the way that the deficit discourse represents itself as being a question of
necessity rather than considered judgement, judgement being supposedly
unnecessary in such a situation, and, in addition, that the discourse acknowledges
no distributional impacts between social forces as a consequence of its
implementation.
While an in-depth account of the mechanisms through which the deficit discourse
is produced and distributed is beyond the scope of this paper, three important
processes are identified here. The first of these is focused on public, legally-
constituted authority, or institutions of the state. Preeminent amongst
government departments everywhere is the Treasury or Ministry of Finance. The
budget process, which is usually secret, is the main means through which the
Treasury establishes its view of what are appropriate and inappropriate policy
choices. Budgetary responsibility provides a point of entry for the Treasury to
review existing arrangements of all kinds in its own terms. Assets can be sold and
governance patterns altered in ways that would otherwise not be possible through
the normal policy-making machinery of government. Constant references to
deficit problems vastly empower the policy effectiveness of the Treasury in
encounters with officials from other agencies who do not have this strategic
financial oversight. The community then, is likely to see Treasury officials as those
"in authority," and to inflate the importance of their discourse accordingly
(Lincoln, 1994: 4).
A second means through which deficit discourse appears to be generated relates
to expertise and professional knowledge, and the judgemental systems which
surround it. This is Lincoln's second sense of authority, where an audience is
prepared to listen and follow the counsel of the speaker, because that speaker is
"an authority" in that they possess (or are supposed to possess) understanding,
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insight or experience which has made them of eminence, to be deferred to.
Academics fall into this category, especially in the natural sciences and to the
extent that they mimic the Cartesian model in the social sciences. Economics is
the most successful here. The judgements of economists about what a prudent
deficit might be are much weightier than those of politicians, even if the
economist in question actually has no understanding of public finance. This
characteristic provides an important avenue in which neoliberal ideas about
appropriate (and inappropriate) types of state intervention can influence deficit
discourse. A more institutionalized form of these judgements are to be found in
the bond rating agencies which publish credit ratings on major securities issues
(Sinclair, 1994). Their views on appropriate financial arrangements are eagerly
followed by potential bond issuers, who have a strong interest in altering their
own activities to secure a better rating and lower their costs of borrowing. Ratings
may also have crucial public impacts on voters and on stockholders, who treat the
agencies as important authorities (Hayward and Salvaris, 1994).
The final means of discourse construction to highlight here is market behavior,
principally in the financial sector, where the value of currencies and of bonds,
stocks and other assets can fluctuate significantly with great consequences for
governments, corporations and society (Woodward, 1994). Typically, in the
mainstream account markets have been perceived as eminently rational and thus
excellent means of judgement about matters like deficits. However, research is
increasingly highlighting the short-termism and less than rational character of
financial behavior (Heisler, 1994). Markets are not, in fact, an unquestionable
source of unbiased opinion, but simply the most developed (and well-resourced)
form of the short-termist, speculative mentality I referred to above as synchronic
(Cox with Sinclair, 1996: 174-188). The fear of financial market judgement, which
has developed with the reemergence of international capital mobility, has
promoted the validity of market conceptions, and is an important element
promoting deficit discourse.
PROGNOSES FOR INVESTMENT, KNOWLEDGE AND GOVERNANCE
What follows from this identification of a deficit discourse? The important
questions which emerge from this discussion of the conditions and construction
of the deficit discourse relate to its likely future impact on the world we live in.
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8. The ontology I incorporate here is adapted from Cox's essay, "Social
Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,"
(Cox with Sinclair, 1996).
9. On this theme, see Thomas and Sinclair (forthcoming).
A series of prognoses are considered below, organized in three broad fields:
investment, knowledge and governance.8
Investment
Three arguments about investment and fiscal rectitude are made here. The first
is what can be 
called the deflection argument. The second is related to competitiveness. The last
argument has to do with policy autonomy. The deflection argument is essentially
about a self-defense mechanism for synchronic investment norms. These norms
seek to legitimate speculation in the non-real economy as worthy, socially-valid
and respectable activities. However, since what Susan Strange has called casino
capitalism took off after the collapse of the Bretton Woods order, average real
wages have remained flat in the West, and especially in the United States (
Strange, 1986; Reich, 1992: 206). Given the dominance within the nascent
hegemony of synchronic norms, this mental schemata excludes distinctions
amongst the types of investment being pursued. In this system of thinking, all
investment has utility, and the real economy has no privilege over others.
Accordingly, there must be some exogenous force, outside the framework of
investment itself, which acts as a drag on wage growth. In the 1970s and 1980s,
this exogenous force was understood to be labor unions, who could be blamed
for the onset of inflation. In the 1990s, these unions were in retreat. Deficit
spending has now become the perfect target for deflecting concern away from
persistent problems of low growth. The most attractive thing about this for
globalizing elites is the fact that the flat real wages of workers can be blamed on
the demands of these same people as voters for all manner of pork barrel policies.
That most of the US deficit is in fact due to demographically-driven entitlement
programs, which reflect the cyclic nature of a more synchronic economy is not,
of course, widely appreciated (Peterson, 1993). 
The second argument suggests that concerns with efficiency in the narrow or
'allocative' sense have given the synchronic hegemony a new militancy. This new
militancy, which is actually a reflection of pervasive economic insecurity even
within globalizing elite circles, opposes the maintenance of socialized risk in a
context of re-emergent international capital mobility.9 This harder edge can be
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10. This new militancy has strong links with Stephen Gill's discussion of
disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill, 1995: 411).
11. These bizarre events are discussed in McQuaig, 1995: 44.
seen in the venom reserved for welfare mothers, the roll-back of affirmative
action in California, and heightened expectations on the part of employers
concerning working hours and labor intensity.10 The anxiety amongst elites is
revealing of their own understanding of the budget discourse and what it means.
The new militancy is not just an external development, it reflects a struggle inside
the leading edge of the hegemony itself. White and Wildavsky have argued that
in Washington, the deficit is seen as a sign of ineptitude. The deficit became a
"symbol of order," and its persistence seems to have generated the view amongst
elites, especially those in the political regime itself, that they were "failing to
govern the nation" (White and Wildavsky, 1989: 428). Focusing on the deficit
through rhetoric that demonizes welfare mothers perhaps acts as a salve for the
wounded confidence of these globalizing elites. Increasingly, this new militancy
is being transmitted in professionalized form, through the agency of bond rating
agencies and the other surveillance and judgemental systems (Sinclair, 1994;
Pauly, 1997).
The third argument is about policy autonomy. The more obvious claim here is
that OECD nations are seeking to lower their deficits so as to avoid leaving
themselves open to political influence by their creditors. This is the implication
of the work on the institutionalization of credit undertaken by Epstein and Gintis,
which identifies a world of uncertain, reluctant lenders and borrowers, and thus
qualified capital mobility (Epstein and Gintis, 1995: 698-699). A less intuitive
argument, but perhaps a more feasible one, focuses on the effects of making a
crisis out of budget deficits, so as to generate external sources of fiscal and more
general policy discipline. External sources, not being subject to the same
constraints as those coming from internal elite sources, might be understood to
'tell it how it is,' with no equivocation or qualification. My view, then, is that
rather than wanting to see governments escape external constraints to a world of
autonomy, globalizing elites are actually endeavoring to terminate national policy
autonomy by attracting these sort of negative judgements. So, for example,
McQuaig found that financial market elites in Toronto actually sought a
downgrade of Government of Canada bonds by the New York credit rating
agencies.11 Policy autonomy was the last thing they wanted to reinforce.
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Knowledge
Three arguments about the knowledge or ideas implications of deficit discourse
are proposed. The first of these evaluates the reductive intellectual impact of the
deficit discourse on how problems are conceived. The second argument looks
again at the private analogy in deficit thinking touched on above. The final point
contemplates the extent to which deficit discourse is an agent of what we might
call epistemic transformation of other positions within the emerging synchronic
orthodoxy. 
A central feature of the impact of the deficit mantra is the effect it has on the way
problems are considered. Not only does the discourse potentially limit the
schemata for thinking about the deficit problem itself, as discussed above, it also
reduces how other problems may be conceived. These limits emerge from the
orthodoxy of economic and financial analysis, the most important mode of
contemporary human judgement and expression. Because the deficit discourse
has emphasized the strategic role of deficit reduction in cross-national
competition, perhaps as a means of popularizing the agenda, the tools used to
make judgements about deficits - the schematic tools - have acquired a new
salience. We can discern a "financialization of knowledge" and an exclusion of
'soft' variables in progress. The society where financialization and empiricization
is most developed is the United States, but the importation of US accounting
standards and the internationalization of business practices is increasing the
salience of this form of knowledge outside the United States at a rapid pace. This
process is linked to the hegemony of professional knowledge over local or
situational knowledge, and the denigration of experience and institutional memory
that are the results of successive efforts to "reengineer" organizations (Hammer
and Champy, 1993). Within the deficit discourse itself, discussions of the savings
'rate' reflect this mentality, in which financial indicators, rather than diachronic
considerations about organically-planned and executed productivity improvement,
are held to be key (Gramlich, 1995: 171).
Western culture places a very high value on pragmatic knowledge focused,
ostensibly, on solving immediate social problems. Discourse, or attempts to make
real what is said to be meaningful, tends to be organized in ways which disguise
the contested nature of its own assumptions through appeals to seemingly
everyday problems with which we are all familiar. This appeal to commonsense
is the reverse of what we might see as the epistemic authority strategy, which
utilizes agents of high repute and is also a crucial aspect of the social construction
of fiscal rectitude (Lincoln, 1994: 3). In the deficit context, as we have seen, the
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12. A Monty Python comedy sketch in which four self-made men discuss the
hardships of their youth, trying to outdo each other in describing the extent of
their privations.
13. Even that bastion of deficit discourse, The Economist, has repudiated the private
analogy (The Economist, February 10, 1996: 90).
way this appeal to commonsense is achieved is by invoking an analogy between
the individual's own bank account and the government's expenditure. "We can't
spend more than we earn, because if we do, our checks will bounce," seems to go
this refrain. "If it makes sense for us, then it does for the
(profligate/wanton/immoral/sinful) government too." This is an enormously
powerful mechanism for the articulators of the discourse to bring into play, as we
have discussed, because it avoids having to explain how government finances
actually work (or indeed, to come to an understanding of them). It appeals to the
most resourceless part of the population who do not have access to credit, and
it has an intergenerational appeal, perhaps along the lines of the "Four
Yorkshiremen" sketch.12 The falseness of it needs little reiteration. Governments
are agents of collective action, and enjoy the most superior creditworthiness
because of their unlimited taxing powers.13 However, its rhetorical effect in
delegitimizing anti-neoliberal social criticism cannot be discounted.
The final point about the knowledge implications of the nascent hegemony has
to do with its effect on changing norms and values. Of all neoliberal policy
platforms deficit cutting is, as discussed, closest to common prejudice. It provides
an entry point for globalizing elites in different parts of the world to pursue the
full range of their agenda. As the most intuitively obvious, it is also the easiest to
sell to a wary community. If done convincingly, if it is a 'good sell,' then other
aspects of the synchronic orthodoxy might be experimented with. There is a very
subtle process of re-education of both local elites and hegemonized communities
taking place here. To understand it more clearly will require extensive research on
business schools, on patterns of foreign student recruitment and the like. Possibly
the most interesting line for further research is the relationship between the
deficit discourse "Trojan horse" and privatization of governmental services. What
is apparent without further work is that deficits provide a crisis context for the
insertion and acceptance of otherwise negatively perceived positions. 
Governance
Three arguments are made about the governance implications of the nascent
deficit hegemony. The first suggests that deficit cutting, the US balanced budget
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14. Caner Bakir helped me make this connection. See Clifford, 1965.
15. This is the view taken by former New Zealand Minister of Finance, Sir
Roger Douglas (Douglas, 1994).
amendment proposal, and fiscal responsibility legislation, are all features of the
new constitutionalism project. The second is that deficit cutting is actually a more
effective form of new constitutionalism because it generates less opposition, and
thus is more likely to succeed than other forms. The final argument made here is
that deficit cutting remains largely an elite concern.
 The new constitutionalist dimension of the deficit discourse has two aspects. The
first is the more obvious, and concerns proposals such as balanced budget
amendments or fiscal responsibility acts, which attempt to tie the hands of
subsequent administrations when perhaps motivated to use fiscal policy as an
electoral tool. Parallels can be seen here with initiatives to give central banks
formal independence from executive agencies that serve ministers, the origins of
which can be found in the aftermath of the subjugation of the Federal Reserve
to the US Treasury during World War II.14 More subtly, we can also discern a new
constitutionalist agenda to allow the financial markets to have more leverage over
government policy, by introducing commercial debt management and by freeing
government pension funds to invest where they see fit rather than just in
government assets. The agenda is to progressively reduce the advantage the
government enjoys in the markets, and thus to increase the costs of future deficit
finance, reducing its attractiveness as a policy option.
From a global governance point of view, where the focus is on diffuse forms of
control, deficit discourse can be seen as a low cost and thus potentially more
effective option than alternatives. The argument is that deficit cutting is
infrastructural and incremental - when done well - and thus likely to encounter
less direct opposition. Over time it can build up an understanding - and thus a
basis for governance - within the hegemonized population about new ways of
doing things (and not doing them). But not all deficit discourse is created equal,
and some will be less effective, in that it will generate more opposition, than
others. The most effective forms will use attrition, productivity gains and
professionalization strategies (such as citizens' or consumers' charters) to
demobilize opposition. On the other hand, short sharp shock strategies may also
work.15 Strategies are likely to be based on the circumstances actually encountered.
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The final argument about the governance implications of the nascent hegemony
of deficit discourse, is that it is hard for elites to maintain public focus on this
matter over time, as the 1996 US presidential election demonstrated. However,
as might be argued from the British experience, strategies focused on adjusting
schemata of perception and practice can be pursued without mass support.
Indeed, the absence of a high profile campaign - such as those pursued by British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for instance - might be a source of governance
strength over the long haul if it limits the potential for organized, effective
opposition.
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion was a first cut at the issues raised by the advent of
deficit discourse. It barely considers the varying degrees to which this discourse
operates or does not work in different parts of the world order. Hopefully, it has
suggested some useful lines of thought for further research and conceptual
development. What follows is a series of preliminary conclusions. The first is that
deficit cutting is actually only properly understood as a political development, and
not the objective or neutral process of technical correction it is represented to be.
It is a process (or processes) pursued by elite interests, it can be thought of as a
covert space of inter-elite competition, and one in which a synchronic social
hegemony is in the process of being constructed.
It also seems reasonable to say at this point that deficit balancing norms and the
degree and form of fiscal rectitude are likely to vary in influence, even as some sort of
broad orthodoxy amongst globalizing elites is established across space. Although
deficit elimination appeals to commonsense notions of financial management,
mass publics seem unlikely to maintain the attention required to secure them
within an explicit balanced budget hegemony over the long run. This in turn
suggests the probable recourse to infrastructural and incremental strategies.
Moreover, small increases in prosperity may blunt the short-run motivation for
deficit-cutting, when new, unexpected revenues improve the fiscal position, as
seems to be the case currently in the United States.
A crucial feature which this paper has only started to consider is the nature of
global processes of promulgation, modification and adoption of deficit discourse.
As in other areas of contemporary economic and financial life, there seems to be
a transnationalization tendency at work here, which is linked to the spread of
American business and policy norms. Given this, and likely future resistance to
this development in other parts of the world order, research also needs to be
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focused on alternative public finance agendas, such as those in the rapidly
developing societies of East Asia, where diachronic norms have been hegemonic
in recent years. Here we might anticipate resistance to the mental orthodoxy of
deficit discourse.
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